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Abstract
Experiences of motion and change are widely taken to have a ‘flow-like’
quality. Call this ‘temporal qualia’. Temporal qualia are commonly thought
to be central to the question of whether time objectively passes: (1) passage
realists take temporal passage to be necessary in order for us to have the
temporal qualia we do; (2) passage antirealists typically concede that time
appears to pass, as though our temporal qualia falsely represent time as pass-
ing. I reject both claims and make the case that passage-talk plays no use-
ful explanatory role with respect to temporal qualia, but rather obfuscates
what the philosophical problem of temporal qualia is. I offer a ‘reduction-
ist’ account of temporal qualia that makes no reference to the concept of
passage and argue that it is well motivated by empirical studies in motion
perception.
1 Introduction
There is a supposed ‘flow-like’ element of our experience of things like motion
and change that is commonly understood as an appearance or representation
of time passing. To point to some token examples from the literature: Norton
1
Explaining TemporalQualia | Matt Farr | September 10, 2019 2
(2010, p. 24) holds that ‘the passage of time is one of our most powerful experi-
ences’; Davies (1996, p. 275) takes the ‘sensation of a flowing time’ to be ‘basic
to my experience of the world’; and Le Poidevin (2007, p. 76) suggests that ‘we
just see time passing in front of us, in […] any motion or change at all’. The
idea of the passage or flow of time being given in experience is widespread but
rarely expressed in terms that go beyond suggestive metaphors. Nonetheless, it
is common even for antirealists about the passage of time — those who deny that
the passage of time is a fundamental feature of the world above and beyond the
temporal aspects of our experience — to nonetheless concede that time appears
to pass, such that our temporal experience constitutes an illusion in this respect.
Call this idea ‘illusionism’. Much contemporary literature in philosophy of time
is devoted to providing a positive account of illusionism by explaining how and
why time appears to pass. This has involved a recent focus on appeals to cogni-
tive science, particularly the various empirical studies of motion perception, to
explain why time appears to pass.¹
This project is based on a mistake. There are two independently legitimate
philosophical problems here that if run together serve to create basic confusions
concerning each: (1) the ontological question of whether time really passes, inde-
pendently of our experience; and (2) how to explain the phenomenal character of
our temporal experience, particularly our perception of things like change and
motion, in light of the relevant research in cognitive science (time perception
illusions, psychophysics experiments, fMRI scans, etc.). Call (1) the problem of
temporal passage, and (2) the problem of temporal qualia. There is no doubt that
there is something it is like to perceive movement and change, and this is ubiqui-
tously compared to the idea of time itself flowing like a river or passing by like
an object. The central argument of this paper is that not only is such a concept of
temporal passage not needed to explain temporal qualia, but that it is wholly ir-
relevant to temporal experience in general and has actively distorted both what
¹See Paul (2010); Norton (2010); Prosser (2012, 2013, 2016); Hoerl (2014); Phillips (2014); Baron
et al. (2015).
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the problem of temporal qualia has been taken to be, and also what kind of a
philosophical problem the debate about temporal passage poses. The contention
of the paper is normative: the problems of temporal passage and temporal qualia
should be kept separate; and temporal qualia should be explained in passage-free
terms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets the terms for the paper by
separating the problem of temporal passage from the problem of temporal qualia.
Section 3 sets out what temporal qualia are, and draws an analogy between the
relationship between temporal qualia and passage and the mind–body problem.
Section 4 outlines four alternative explanatory models for temporal qualia, ar-
guing that passage-realist models fail to offer any explanatory advantage with
regard to our temporal qualia. In section 5, I argue that time perception illusions
should not be read as supporting the claim that temporal qualia are illusory, but
rather motivate a ‘reductionist’ account of temporal qualia according to which
temporal qualia are in general reliable indicators of change and motion in world.
Section 6 sets out reductionism about temporal qualia in further detail, defend-
ing it on naturalist grounds by demonstrating that it is both continuous with
and supported by empirical studies in time perception: first, reductionism offers
a pluralist account of temporal qualia as consisting of a cluster of loosely related
cognitive responses to physical change andmotion, rather than offering a unified
representation of passage, in-keepingwith the pluralism ofmechanisms involved
in time perception; second, reductionism is supported by the phenomenon of mo-
tion blindness, where subjects lack certain kinds of motion qualia. Section 7 is
the conclusion.
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2 Temporal passage and temporal qualia: Two inde-
pendent philosophical problems
2.1 Passage realism
Temporal experience is often offered as evidence in favour of the ‘A theory of
time’, and against the ‘B theory of time’. The A and B theories of time are stan-
dardly taken to disagree over the ontological status of temporal passage. The A
theory holds that the following two facts hold independently of our existence
and our temporal location: (1) there is a privileged ‘present’ moment of time;
(2) time passes. The B theory rejects both (1) and (2), holding that any beliefs
we have about the specialness of the present, or of the objectivity of the flow
of time, are to be explained as features of our temporal perspective, rather than
perspective-independent features of the world.² Though (2) is often understood
in terms of the movement of the present moment, the concept of temporal pas-
sage is conceptually distinct from (1).³ ‘Temporal passage’ and ‘time flow’ are at
base heuristic metaphors: we know what it is like to see a river flow or an object
pass us by, and the idea behind passage realism is that our temporal experience
as a whole is like this in that time itself appears to pass or flow. Such a metaphor
is clearly problematic, since there appears nothing intrinsically special about the
flow of a river of the passing-by of an object that the perception of which would
constitute a perception or awareness of time as passing any more than any other
kind of motion or change. But such details about how to explicate the concept of
passage and its alleged phenomenological features can be put to one side since
my central aim is to get rid of the metaphor in the explanation of temporal qualia.
²Though the B theory is antirealist about passage, it standardly assumes a preferred direction
of time, as implied by its usage of ‘earlier than’ as an ordering relation. I elsewhere (Farr, 2012,
2018, MS) have introduced and defended an alternative ‘C theory’ of time, according to which
time neither passes nor has a privileged direction. The C theory, I contend, treats temporal qualia
in the reductionist way I defend in this paper.
³We can imagine someone denying that time has a privileged present moment whilst still
holding time to pass in a sense in which space does not — for example, see Maudlin (2007, ch. 4).
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I will instead reserve the term ‘temporal passage’ in this paper for the idea of
something over-and-above the B-theoretic features of the world that has some
important connection to the kinds of processes and experiences we ordinarily
term ‘temporal’. To unpack this a bit: the B theory holds the world to contain a
number of temporal facts which are expressible in terms of relative spatial and
temporal locations, such as that there are temporally-extended objects that take
on different properties and positions at different times. Passage realism holds
that beyond the B-facts, time has some intrinsic dynamic quality that serves to
distinguish it from space, which is a feature of the world and not merely part of
our conscious representation of it. Since I am interested only in temporal passage,
and not the idea of a privileged present moment, I will use the terms ‘passage
realism’ and ‘passage antirealism’ to refer to the two sides of the debate rather
than ‘A theory’ and ‘B theory’.⁴
2.2 Passage antirealism
Passage realism has been subject to a number of famous critiques: McTaggart
(1908) argues that the concept of temporal passage is incoherent; Broad (1938)
and others⁵ object that temporal passage requires the existence of multiple time
dimensions; Eddington (1928) argues that the concept of temporal passage plays
no role in physical theory; Putnam (1967) and Rietdijk (1966) hold that temporal
passage is incompatible with special relativity theory; and Gödel (1949) argues
that temporal passage is inconsistent with general relativity theory. A conse-
quence of this lopsided dialectic is that passage antirealism has had a relatively
free ride, being explicated primarily in terms of what it rejects. However, the
passage antirealist nonetheless requires a positive account of why time has the
peculiar experiential features that it does. A popular move is to regard passage
⁴Indeed, the passage realism and A/B theory debates themselves come apart in various ways.
For instance, Maudlin (2007) defends passage realism without the A theory, and Tallant (2010)
defends a version of the A theory without passage realism.
⁵This objection to temporal passage has been raised by Dunne (1939), Smart (1949) and Black
(1959).
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as a kind of illusion associated with our temporal experience that requires input
from cognitive science — for instance Paul (2010) argues that change and mo-
tion illusions provide an important insight into how we could come to have an
illusion of temporal passage.
2.3 Eliminating passage-talk
My contention, which I detail in sections 5 and 6, is that insofar as empirical
psychology bears on the problem of temporal qualia, it serves to favour a reduc-
tionist account of temporal qualia whereby they are understood as phenomenal
features of our range of abilities to detect real or illusory motion and change. I
make the case that the analysis of human motion and change perception pro-
vides no empirical grounds for holding either that (a) our temporal qualia onto-
logically or causally depend upon the passage of time, or (b) our temporal qualia
form a unified representation of a mind-independent phenomenon of temporal
passage that accords to the passage realist’s concept of passage. As such, I ar-
gue there is no need to draw a connection between the problems of temporal
passage and temporal qualia, and thus that reductionism offers a more promis-
ing approach. Reductionism is an account of how to understand what temporal
qualia are, rather than an account of how to understand temporal passage. Re-
ductionism is most naturally understood as a passage antirealist position, since it
holds that there is no interesting link between our experience and the concept of
temporal passage, undermining the central claims of the passage realist accounts
I will consider. There is nonetheless logical space for someone to be a reduction-
ist about temporal qualia whilst holding that time passes for some independent
reason. This is a consequence of treating the problems of temporal qualia and
temporal passage as wholly independent of each other.
Siblings of such a reductionist position about temporal phenomenology have
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been outlined⁶ and defended⁷ in the recent literature on the grounds that the
claim that temporal phenomenology is systematically illusory is conceptually
problematic and/or unintelligible. In particular Hoerl (2014) suggests that it is a
mistake to hold that we have a phenomenology of temporal passage at all. This
is a claim about the phenomenological character of temporal experience; indeed,
Hoerl (p. 192) notes that this is a further error theory to that of the illusionist:
the illusionist’s belief that we have non-veridical passage phenomenology is it-
self an illusion. While such a position is welcome, I will not argue that we do
not have passage phenomenology, nor that our phenomenology in itself is what
should motivate a passage-antirealist attitude over a passage-realist one. On the
contrary, I take it that we do have qualia that are worth grouping and charac-
terising as ‘temporal’, and these have a phenomenal character that is commonly
associated with the idea of time as passing. However insofar as we do have
temporal qualia, I argue that it is a mistake to regard such qualia as function-
ing as a representation of time as passing, since such a position is not forced
through philosophical argument, nor is such a claim useful in categorising the
ways inwhichwe can successfully or unsuccessfully represent things likemotion
or change. Rather, my central claim is that very tendency to relate the problems
of temporal passage and temporal qualia in the first place serves only to confuse
two independent philosophical problems: nothing is gained in the explanation
of temporal qualia by referring to the concept of temporal passage.
⁶Baron et al. (2015) term a related position ‘veridicalism’, which holds both that time does not
pass, and that we do not experience time as passing, hence temporal phenomenology is largely
veridical and not systematically illusory. Miller et al. (2018) detail a range of different veridicalist
positions. Relatedly, Torrengo (2017) offers an important nuance to the debate, defending a view
whereby we do have a feeling or sensation of time as passing, but this amounts to a modifier of
our temporal phenomenology rather than a representation of time as passing.
⁷Deng (2013, 2019) and Hoerl (2014) each express scepticism as to whether we have a phe-
nomenology of passage, and argue that the passage-antirealist (for Deng, the ‘B theorist’; for
Hoerl, the ‘reductionist’ about temporal passage) possess sufficient resources to account for the
apparently animated aspects of change and motion perception without recourse to the passage
realist’s ontology.
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3 What is the problem of temporal qualia?
A quale is a phenomenal, qualitative aspect of an experience, and qualia is the
plural form. The qualia of some experience are generally described as the ‘what-
it’s-like’ properties of having that experience, such as what it is like to experience
the specific shades of turquoise of the sea around the Great Barrier Reef. As
such, qualia are necessarily of a first-person nature; there are no qualia without
experiencers. In the temporal case, experiences of change and motion are widely
appealed to as having distinctively temporal qualia, with some holding these
to be to some degree experiences of the passage of time, such as Le Poidevin’s
claim that we ‘see’ the passage of time in ‘any motion or change at all.’ Visual
perception of change and motion are the most typically cited instances of the
passage-like features of our experience, and we’ll focus primarily on these.⁸
3.1 ‘Temporal qualia’ as an umbrella term
We can group change and motion qualia and other related kinds of qualia⁹ —
i.e. the phenomenal character associated with veridical or illusory perception of
change and motion — under the general label ‘temporal qualia’. In this sense,
‘temporal qualia’ can be considered an umbrella term that refers to any qualia
we typically associate with the concept of time. I shall use the term in this neu-
tral way, to refer to temporal qualia as a whole and not to imply that there is
some unique phenomenological property shared by temporal qualia that other,
non-temporal, types of qualia lack.¹⁰ The following facts are uncontroversial:
first, things change and move in the world; second, we experience things as
⁸The examples of change andmotionwe consider in this paper concern only visual perception.
There are various other sensory modalities with which we experience time, such as sound and
touch, that we will not consider. See Phillips (2014) for a recent survey piece that covers cross-
modal temporal experience.
⁹It is often noted that there is something it is like to see one event succeed another, and
to perceive different lengths of duration, and as such succession and duration arguably involve
relevant temporal qualia. I will only refer to motion and change qualia for sake of brevity, but
this is not to imply that these are the only kinds of temporal qualia.
¹⁰See Prosser (2013, pp. 80–82) for a useful discussion of a related issue.
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changing and moving; third, our experience of change and motion has partic-
ular phenomenological features that we typically associate with the concept of
temporal passage; fourth, we can and do have change and motion qualia that
do not correspond to actual change or motion in the world, owing to perceptual
illusions.
To fix on the example of motion for a moment: there is something it is like to
seemotion, andwe standardly havemotion qualia in response to seeing amoving
body, such as a bird flying past the window. Moreover, it is important that this
set of qualia is not simply a perception of motion, since perceptual illusions can
trigger non-veridical motion qualia in the absence of motion, and conversely
cases of motion blindness (which we consider in section 6) show that one can
have awareness of motion without corresponding motion qualia.¹¹ What is less
clear and more contentious is whether any part of our experience corresponds
to temporal passage in an analogous way.
3.2 Are temporal qualia representational?
Though the term ‘qualia’ is used to denote a variety of different concepts in
the philosophical literature on perception, I shall use it to refer to the phenom-
enal character of experience in general.¹² The central debate regarding qualia
is whether they are representational in nature, with ‘qualia’ sometimes being
used to denote only non-representational features of experience. The distinctive
‘flow-like’ or ‘animated’ features of temporal qualia are commonly implied in
the philosophy of time literature to be representational in nature: passage re-
alists standardly take their position to be motivated by experience in that time
appears to us as passing and we should take physical time to possess such a
¹¹Throughout this paper, I use ‘motion’ to refer to the relative motion of an object with respect
to an observer.
¹²Tye (2018) notes there are at least three popular alternative usages of the term: (2) in the
context of sense data theory, referring to the non-representational qualitative aspects of sense
data; (3) as non-representational features of experience in general (independent of the wider
claims of sense data theory); and (4) as intrinsic, ineffable aspects of experience.
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property; and illusionists, though they are antirealist about temporal passage,
take our temporal qualia to constitute an illusion insofar as they amount to an
inaccurate representation of time as passing.
The reductionist account of temporal qualia I defend does not take temporal
qualia to be representational in this sense, and as such is in accord with the pop-
ular view of qualia in general as non-representational. However, reductionism
is very specific in this regard. First, there is no ‘passage quale’ — i.e. some qualia
purely associated with temporal passage that accompanies motion and change
qualia. Second, to pick on a specific type of temporal qualia, we should at best
think motion qualia to function as a generally reliable indicator of real motion,
but not to indicate anything further, such as there being an intrinsically flow-like
quality of moving things. As a result, temporal qualia do not in any sense form
a representation of time as passing.
3.3 Temporal qualia and the explanatory gap
Just as themind–body dualist takes physicalism to be unable to account for qualia
due to an explanatory gap between the mental and physical,¹³ the passage real-
ist can hold a passage-antirealist ontology (i.e. the B-facts) to be insufficient to
account for temporal qualia. Following Chalmers’ (1996) famous ‘zombie’ argu-
ment against physicalism, the passage realist may take it to be possible for a
world to share the same B-facts as our world but lack the passage of time, and
for inhabitants of such a world to hence lack temporal qualia, such that their
experience is somehow deficient to ours in key respects in that things don’t ap-
pear to ‘flow’ in the same way.¹⁴ Maudlin (2007), for instance, implies that in a
passageless world, people would not be conscious — we come back to this issue
in sec. 4. Passage is often taken to be the ‘something extra’ required to bridge
¹³Cf. Levine (1983).
¹⁴Though passage realism is in this sense analogous to kinds of dualism (such as Chalmers’
property dualism), it doesn’t follow that the passage realist must reject physicalism. The passage
realist could be a physicalist but simply hold that B-facts are not sufficient to account for the
properties of physical time.
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the gap and connect the manifest and scientific images of time: Eddington (1928,
p. 34; my emphases) notes that ‘[s]omething [i.e. passage] must be added to the
geometrical conceptions comprised in Minkowski’s world before it becomes a
complete picture of the world as we know it;’ and Davies (1996, p. 275; my em-
phasis) stresses that the ‘sensation of a flowing time […] is an aspect of time of
great significance that we have so far overlooked in our description of the physical
universe’.
It is not necessary to hold that there is such an explanatory gap. To extend
the analogy between the philosophy of time and philosophy of mind, we can
think of the passage antirealist as akin to the physicalist: just as the physicalist
takes qualia to necessarily follow from the physical facts (e.g. pain qualia is just
what it’s like to be in pain), the passage antirealist can take temporal qualia as a
necessary consequence of beings like us interacting with a B-theoretic ontology;
temporal qualia don’t need any extra explanans.¹⁵
This problem is famously addressed by Williams (1951), who holds that it is a
mistake for passage realists to think that ‘they alone are “taking time seriously”’
(p. 458). As Williams notes, this falsely assumes that the passage antirealist does
not wish to account for the temporal idiosyncrasies of experience. On the con-
trary the passage antirealist simply holds that the apparently dynamic aspects of
temporal experience that are generally termed as ‘passage’ or ‘flow’ are fully en-
tailed by their picture of time. This point is further emphasised by Prosser (2013),
noting that since ‘both [passage realist and antirealist] theories, on their own
terms, predict the same experiences[, …] experience does not favour one theory
over the other’ (p. 71). As such, we should not hold that ‘our experience of tense
and temporal becoming […] overwhelms any B-theoretic arguments against the
reality of tense’ as Craig (2000, p. 165) claims, nor that ‘realism about tense is
uniquely capable of making sense of the phenomenology of temporal experience’
¹⁵Perry (2001) adopts this analogy in the case of ‘nowness’. Perry argues thatMellor’s (1998) ar-
gument for the B theory amounts to a temporal version of Jackson’s (1986) ‘knowledge argument’,
with A-theorists holding that a property of ‘nowness’ is required to explain temporally-indexical
beliefs.
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as Hare (2010, p. 762) suggests on behalf of the passage realist. Sentiments such
as these compromise the dialectic of the passage debate by unfairly stacking the
deck against the passage antirealist through implying that they do not take their
theory to entail nor take seriously temporal qualia.
It follows that the passage antirealist can simply deny the explanatory gap
and hold instead that temporal qualia are perfectly possible without temporal
passage; the antirealist is not seeking to deny that we have temporal qualia but
rather offering a theory of it that does not depend upon passage. What this
brings to the fore is that the dispute between passage realism and antirealism is
not whether temporal qualia are to be explained, but rather what is considered
necessary in order for them to be explained. The passage realist holds the passage
of time to play crucial role in explaining how it is that we have temporal qualia,
and so by their lights the passage antirealist lacks an explanation of how it is that
we have temporal qualia. The passage antirealist rejects this, holding instead that
no explanation is needed for how we can come to have temporal qualia in the
absence of passage. It follows that the problem of temporal passage is a priori
in nature, and not, therefore, something to be settled with reference to temporal
qualia.
3.4 What is the explanatory problem of temporal qualia?
In treating the problem of temporal qualia independently of the problem of tem-
poral passage, I have two aims. Firstly, temporal qualia does not equate to an
experience of passage. In this context, Paul (2010) coins the phrase “experience
as of ” in order to speak of our passage-like phenomenology without implying
that it is veridical (i.e. corresponds to real passage). However, my second aim is
to go a step further and avoid prejudging that our experience of time involves ex-
perience ‘as of’ passage at all.¹⁶ Rather, the very idea that temporal qualia in any
coherent sense represent time as passing — whether veridically or erroneously
¹⁶See Deng (2013) and Hoerl (2014) for criticisms of the claim that we have experiences ‘as of’
passage.
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— is a mistake that leads to misrepresenting what it is about temporal qualia that
stands in need of explanation.
Consider two alternative ways to pose the explanatory problem of temporal
qualia:
Q1. Why does it appear to us as though time passes?
Q2. How do we account for the specific kinds of temporal qualia we have?
In the next two sections, I argue that Q1 poses a problem that does not stand in
need of explanation. In sec. 4 I argue that the claim that passage is necessary
for temporal qualia plays no role in accounting for what is special about motion
and change qualia. In sec. 5 I argue that passage antirealists, insofar as they
do not share this claim, are not required to address Q1 — on their terms, the
question is a non-issue. As such, the claim that temporal qualia are illusory
as regards temporal passage, and related attempts to explain away passage as
being a cognitive illusion, are fundamentally misguided. Q2, on the contrary,
represents a tractable and interesting issue that is far more amenable to input
from cognitive science. Sections 5 and 6 detail specific ways in which cognitive
science bears upon Q2, and crucially, how such empirical investigation fits best
with a reductionist account of temporal qualia.
4 How (not) to explain temporal qualia
In separating the concepts of temporal qualia and temporal passage, we can ask
more detailed questions about how they relate. First, is temporal passage neces-
sary for temporal qualia? And secondly, do temporal qualia represent temporal
passage? These two issues are independent but are often run together, and con-
sidering the different combinations of yes/no answers to these questions gives
us a range of positions as laid out in table 1. I’ll first summarise these positions
before critiquing them.
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Table 1: The different strategies for explaining temporal qualia. TP=Temporal
passage; TQ=temporal qualia; RR=representational realism; IR=inferential real-
ism.
RR IR Illusionism Reductionism
Is TP necessary for TQ? 3 3 7 7
Do TQ represent TP? 3 7 3 7
Representational Realism. Temporal passage is necessary for temporal qualia.
Temporal qualia represent temporal passage.
Representational realism corresponds to the idea that we directly experience tem-
poral passage. On this account, our temporal qualia track temporal passage inso-
far as they are a veridical conscious representation of temporal passage and are
caused by temporal passage.
Inferential Realism. Temporal passage is necessary for temporal qualia. Tem-
poral qualia need not represent temporal passage.
Inferential realism relaxes the idea that we have direct experience of temporal
passage, instead holding temporal passage to be a necessary precondition for
temporal qualia, and hence that we can legitimately infer that such a thing must
exist in order to account for our having temporal qualia.
Illusionism. Temporal passage is not necessary for temporal qualia. Temporal
qualia represent temporal passage.
Illusionism holds our experience of time to be fundamentally misleading in that
although time appears to us as passing, this is a cognitive illusion and fails to
correspond to a mind-independent feature of the world.
Reductionism. Temporal passage is not necessary for temporal qualia. Tempo-
ral qualia do not represent temporal passage.
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Finally, reductionism holds that temporal qualia neither depend upon nor repre-
sent temporal passage: change and motion qualia (and any other kind of tempo-
ral qualia) are simply indicators of things changing or moving over time. When I
see a lorikeet flying past my window, any flow-like qualities of my motion qualia
are simply what it is like to represent the lorikeet’s motion as it takes on a series
of different positions in my visual field relative to the background scenery over
a short period of time.
4.1 Representational realism
Though I have argued in sec. 3 that the problem of temporal passage is a priori in
nature and so is not to be settled by reference to temporal qualia, it is worth going
through independent shortcomings of passage-realist approaches to the problem
of temporal qualia. First, representational realism is the most extreme position
of the four approaches to temporal qualia in that temporal qualia function as the
direct perception of temporal passage. Though this view is reasonably intuitive,
it is subject to a basic epistemic problem that calls for a more sophisticated ex-
planatory model of temporal qualia. Eddington (1928, p. 91) notes that such a
view ‘is tantamount to an admission that consciousness, looking out through a
private door, can learn by direct insight an underlying character of the world
which physical measurements do not betray’. If temporal passage is something
over and above the existence of changing and moving things in the world, then
the problem is how we could we gain epistemic access to such a thing. Tem-
poral passage is not something present in physics textbooks; we don’t need to
know any special properties of the passage of time to account for the behaviour
of any known phenomena (except allegedly our first-person experience of time).
As such, this requires some kind of special connection between our brains and
temporal passage that ‘goes around’ the physical sciences. There is good reason
to suppose then that if passage is to play a role in the explanation of temporal
qualia, it is not in the sense that our temporal qualia are offering a glimpse into
an underlying feature of the world.
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4.2 Inferential realism
Inferential realism shares with representational realism the idea that temporal
passage plays a key role in explaining temporal qualia, but it relaxes the claim
that we experience temporal passage — instead we can think of temporal passage
as something that is inferred by the realist from the general ‘feel’ of temporal
qualia. Inferential realism instead holds that the relationship between passage
and temporal qualia is that the former is necessary for the latter; without tem-
poral passage, we wouldn’t have temporal qualia. Recent advocates of such a
position include Maudlin (2007) and Norton (2010).¹⁷ Maudlin considers what
we can call temporal zombie worlds¹⁸ — worlds physically identical to our own
but stipulated to not contain temporal passage — and argues that ‘unless one
already has begged the central question’ against passage realism, it follows that
‘the state of this [zombie] world is so unlike the physical state of anything in
our universe that to suppose that there are mental states at all is completely un-
founded’ (Maudlin, 2007, p. 124). In a similar vein, Norton argues that temporal
passage is required to explain why our psychological timeline matches the tem-
poral order of events in the world, holding that ‘if passage is an illusion, there
must be some mechanism that blocks us perceiving the future’ (Norton, 2010, p.
30), implying like Maudlin that without passage we would not have the kind of
temporal experience that we do.
Though inferential realism avoids the epistemic problem faced by representa-
tional realism, it faces a more basic problem regarding the relationship between
temporal passage and temporal qualia: there is no sense in which inferential
¹⁷It should be note that both Maudlin and Norton make claims that sound as though temporal
passage is in some sense experienced, more in line with representational realism. However, both
put forward models in which the key relation between temporal qualia and temporal passage is
that the former counterfactually depend upon the latter, in line with inferential realism.
¹⁸Maudlin’s points are made specifically against Price’s (1996) version of Williams’ (1951)
thought experiment, involving a world physically identical to our own but stipulated to not con-
tain temporal passage. Price argues that there is no reason to suppose beings in such a world
would experience time differently from ourselves, since on any fair mapping of physical states
from the passage world to the no-passage world, the brain states of individuals would be mapped
from the former to the latter.
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realism can explain why the paradigm instances of temporal qualia — motion
and change qualia — are special vis-à-vis passage. Take Maudlin’s suggestion
that inhabitants of a passageless temporal zombie world would not have mental
states: if temporal qualia and temporal passage are related in this way, then any
conceivable mental state would stand in the same dependence relation to tem-
poral passage regardless of whether it concerns experience of time, or thoughts
about the size of elephants’ ears, or whatever. This account fails because it is
too general: there is no unique link between temporal passage and the charac-
teristically temporal kinds of qualia, such as motion and change qualia, meaning
that such a dependence relation between temporal qualia and temporal passage
provides no explanation of what makes temporal qualia special for the passage
realist. Prosser (2013, p. 82) picks on this generality of explanation in passage
realist accounts of temporal qualia, noting that even if such accounts were true,
temporal qualia would fail to constitute a ‘unique, perception-constituting rela-
tion to the passage of time’.¹⁹ But this point goes deeper: even if the realist is
happy to weaken the perceptual claim and accept that temporal qualia function
as something less than a perception or representation of passage, as the inferen-
tial realist does, the key explanatory problem remains: there is no account at all
of why motion and change qualia in particular should be analogous in any sense
to the nature of the passage of time, since other mental states equally dependent
on temporal passage clearly are not. As such, inferential realism does not explain
temporal qualia.
5 Abusing your illusion
Putting passage realist models to one side, it is common to portray passage-
antirealist positions (i.e. B-theories) as holding some kind of illusionism about
temporal qualia. For instance, from the passage-antirealism camp: Smart (1980,
¹⁹Prosser specifically talks of temporal phenomenology rather than qualia, but for our purposes
this difference in terminology makes no odds.
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p. 3) holds that ‘the alleged passage of time […] is an illusion’; and Prosser (2012,
p. 92) holds that ‘the B-theory cannot be regarded as fully satisfactory until an
adequate account has been given of the illusion of passage’. Moreover, passage
realists typically cite the perceived flaws of illusionism as supporting their po-
sition: Davies (1996, p. 275) is ‘repelled by the claim that [passage] is only an
illusion or misperception’; Maudlin (2007, p. 135) holds that ‘all the philosophiz-
ing in the world will not convince us that these facts [that time appears to pass]
are mere illusions’; and Norton (2010, p. 23) remarks that ‘[e]xplaining passage
away as an illusion is an instance of a desperate stratagem that has been used
to ill effect elsewhere when we become too eager to explain away an awkward
fact’.
I share the latter sentiments that it is undesirable to hold temporal qualia to
be systematically illusory, but think that rather than supporting passage realism,
it supports a best-of-both-worlds option, which is to reject the idea that temporal
qualia represent passage in the first place. The study of time perception better
supports the claim that temporal qualia are in general veridical, with time percep-
tion illusions highlighting specific exceptional circumstances in which temporal
qualia erroneously indicate change and motion in unchanging and motionless
objects.
5.1 When temporal qualia are illusory
There is a range of well-studied time perception illusions that are instructive
with respect to temporal qualia since they constitute cases where temporal qualia
demonstrably fail to function as accurate indicators of real motion and change,
since subjects have change and motion qualia in the absence of changing or mov-
ing stimuli. These include (but are not restricted to):
Phi Phenomenon. A series of still images of differently positioned dots pre-
sented to an observer in rapid succession give rise to the illusory percep-
tion of a single enduring object in continuous motion between the dot
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Figure 1: The Rotating Snakes illusion (Kitaoka, 2016)
locations (cf. Wertheimer (1912); for a demonstration, see Bach (2014a)).
Motion Aftereffect. A subject’s visual system adapts to a moving image, such
that after the stimulus is removed, the subject appears to perceive the
inverse motion (cf. Mather et al. (1998); for a demonstration, see Bach
(2014b)).
Peripheral Drift. A still image appears to contain motion as the eye scans
around the image (cf. Fraser and Wilcox (1979). A particularly vivid
example of this is Kitaoka’s rotating snakes illusion [fig. 1]).
Each of these three kinds of motion illusion demonstrates a different way
in which temporal qualia can be illusory. The two that are of most interest are
the motion aftereffect and peripheral drift illusions. In the case of motion af-
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tereffect illusions, temporal qualia are illusory insofar as they continue after a
motion-involving stimulus is removed. A paradigm example is the waterfall illu-
sion, where after staring at a waterfall for some time and then shifting focus to
the adjacent rock face, the rock face appears to be moving upwards, in the op-
posite direction to the water. Motion aftereffect illusions are the product of our
visual system adapting to a continuous motion by counteracting to the motion,
with the result of reducing the intensity of the perceived motion and the corre-
sponding sense of disorientation. A consequence of this is that once the stimulus
is removed, the neural adaptation creates the illusion of motion in the opposite
direction to that of the original stimulus. Thus, one has motion qualia that are an
effect of real motion, but continue in the absence of that motion, and also give the
appearance of motion in the opposite direction. The resulting motion qualia are
not veridical, although they are a consequence of past motion. Peripheral drift
illusions are of greater interest in this regard insofar as the motion qualia are
not a consequence of actual motion in the object being perceived. As the name
suggests, a peripheral drift illusion involves the illusion of motion in the periph-
ery. Such illusions incorporate repeated patterns of asymmetric luminance that
in peripheral vision appear as motion in the dark-to-light direction, as vividly
depicted in fig. 1.²⁰ The motion qualia are generated without the presence of a
moving stimulus, unlike motion aftereffect illusions.²¹
The phi phenomenon represents a different kind of illusion with respect to
temporal qualia. In the paradigm case of a pair of flashing dots sequentially
appearing at opposite ends of a screen, the observer typically projects a single dot
moving at high speed from side to side.²² Such a case is interesting with regard to
²⁰See Fraser andWilcox (1979) for the original presentation of the peripheral drift illusion and
Faubert and Herbert (1999) for analysis. Backus and Oruç (2005) additionally offers an analysis
of Kitaoka’s rotating snakes illusion.
²¹Backus and Oruç (2005) argue that this type of illusion is due not to the shift of one’s visual
focus around the image, but rather ‘fast and slow changes over time in the neuronal representa-
tion of contrast […] or luminance’ (p. 1055).
²²In the case of the ‘color-phi’ illusion, the dots are of different colours, and so the illusory
moving dot gradually changes colour.
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temporal qualia insofar as it provides an example in which the perceived motion
of the dot is illusory. Moreover, this case has been taken as an instance of human
subjects using an ‘endurantist’ representation of the dots as a single, enduring
dot (for instance, both Paul (2010) and Prosser (2013) argue along these lines. I
consider Paul’s treatment of this later in this section).
Time perception illusions demonstrate that temporal qualia can be produced
in the absence of actual physical change or motion in the relevant object being
observed, and hence are illusory in this respect. A consequence of this is that
there is a key sense in which temporal qualia are, in general, veridical: our tem-
poral qualia, except under specific well-studied and well-understood conditions,
reliably indicate and are triggered by change and/or motion of the perceived ob-
jects. Time perception illusions represent anomalous cases, and the study of the
psychophysical and physiological details of these aids the understanding of how
the brain produces the appearance of motion and change, and under precisely
what conditions these fail to be veridical.
5.2 Why illusions don’t imply illusionism
The veridical nature of temporal qualia in ordinary conditions stands in direct
contrast to the central claim of illusionism, which is that temporal qualia are
systematically illusory insofar as they represent something — temporal passage
— that does not exist. Paul (2010) makes the case that time perception illusions,
particularly the phi phenomenon, are illustrative in understanding illusionism.
In the case of the phi phenomenon — let’s again use the case of the flashing dots
— the brain fills in the space between the two dot locations so it appears as though
a single dot is traveling at high speed between the two locations. Paul suggests
by analogy:
[W]hen we have an experience as of passage, we can interpret this
as an experience that is the result of the brain producing a neural
state that represents inputs from earlier and later temporal stages
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and simply ‘fills in’ the representation of motion or of changes. Thus,
according to the [illusionist],²³ there is no real flow or animation in
changes that occur across time. Rather, a stage of one’s brain creates
the illusion of such flow, as the causal effect of prior stages on (this
stage of) one’s brain. (Paul, 2010, p. 352; my emphasis)
This gives a specific picture of how an illusionist explanation of temporal qualia
might work. The idea is that by drawing on the sense in which we can have
motion qualia in the absence of corresponding motion in the relevant physical
object, the passage antirealist can give a general heuristic for how in principle
one can have temporal qualia in a world without passage. I’ve argued that this
is not a task that the passage antirealist need take up. Instead, the reductionist
about temporal qualia rejects the idea that we have ‘experiences as of passage’
insofar as (a) there is no single ‘passage quale’ — rather the ‘flow’ or ‘animation’
are features of temporal qualia in general (such as motion qualia) — , and (b)
temporal qualia in general don’t represent time as passing in the way in which
the concept of temporal passage is ordinarily understood (as something over and
above the B-facts). In light of this, the reductionist denies that there is an illusion
to explain here: if the flow and animation are simply what it is like to perceive
real or imaginary motion and/or change, then it is not illusory, since in general
it reliably tracks real change and motion.
There are strong independent reasons for taking such an error theory to be
in vain. Although there is certainly a general analogy between, on the one hand,
our ability to project motion qualia in the absence of a moving stimulus, and on
the other hand, the illusionist’s claim that we project temporal passage onto re-
ality as a whole despite there being no such thing, there is a major problem with
²³Paul uses the term ‘reductionist’, so it is necessary to distinguish the position to which she
refers from the position I call reductionism. Paul is referring to the reductionist about temporal
passage, such as the B theorist, who takes our experience of time to not depend upon the reality
of temporal passage. This picks out passage antirealism in general. She also takes ‘reductionism’
to be committed to the idea that passage is an illusion. I use ‘reductionism’ as shorthand for
‘reductionism about temporal qualia’, which holds that temporal qualia reduces to motion qualia,
change qualia, and the like.
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such an approach: there are key senses in which the term ‘illusion’ is explana-
torily useful in the first case that fail to carry over to the second and ultimately
promote unnecessary confusion about the nature of our temporal experience.
Take the rotating snakes illusion (fig. 1): the illusion consists in the appearance
of motion as a result of looking at a still image. Such illusions involve a percep-
tual stimulus giving rise to misleading qualia. A hallmark of such illusions is that
there are independent ways of verifying that the stimulus lacks such a quality
— in this case, we can independently verify in a number of ways that fig. 1 is a
still image, and so confirm that our motion qualia are misleading us. ²⁴ Indeed
a key feature of perceptual illusions is that there are localised in that they gen-
erally do not apply wholesale across all of our sensory modalities, allowing us
to establish that they are indeed illusions. However, the illusionist’s account of
the illusion of temporal passage is of a different kind.²⁵ In the case of illusion-
ism, temporal qualia are both permanently and systematically illusory insofar as:
(1) every temporal quale erroneously represents something — temporal passage
— that does not correspond to anything in reality; (2) the illusion of passage is
consistent across all of our sensory modalities.
With regard to (1), the illusionist is committed to the unwelcome conse-
quence that ordinary experiences of motion and illusory motion qualia are
equally illusory with respect to passage, and as such, there is a major disanalogy
between standard cognitive illusions and the alleged illusion of passage. Accord-
ing to the illusionist, we are under the illusion of passage both in the case that
we observe real motion, such as seeing a bird fly by, and in the case that we
observe illusory motion, such as with the rotating snakes illusion.²⁶
²⁴I use the rotating snakes illusion here as my example, but the same reasoning applies also to
Paul’s example of the phi phenomenon.
²⁵As Norton (2010, p. 23) notes: ‘[w]e know what illusions are like and how to detect them.
Passage exhibits no sign of being an illusion’.
²⁶Alternatively, Deng (2013) suggests that the analogy drawn by Paul is itself ambiguous: ei-
ther the illusion of motion in the phi phenomenon and the illusionist’s alleged illusion of passage
are distinct illusions; or they are different aspects of the same illusion. If the former, Deng sug-
gests that ‘it is hard to see what the second illusion [the illusion of passage] could be’ (p. 377). If
the latter, it is unclear what is to be gained by the analogy.
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With regard to (2), the illusionist’s alleged illusion of passage would presum-
ably also have to be cross-modal in nature, affecting all of our sensory mecha-
nisms, so that time would not only visibly appears to pass, but also sound and
feel as though it were passing. There is no doubt that the rotating snakes illusion
would be all the more powerful and interesting were it to also produce the illu-
sion of auditory and tactile motion together with visual motion, but there is no
such all-encompassing motion illusion to be found in the literature.
Whereas the concept of an illusion is useful and informative in the case of
whether motion qualia tracks actual motion, it is by contrast unhelpful to use
the same concept with respect to whether all types of temporal qualia track tem-
poral passage. In the former case, we know how to measure whether something
has moved in a way that corresponds to one’s motion qualia (in part due to the
fact that such illusions are typically restricted to one of the sensory modalities),
but in the latter case, it is not clear what could possibly count as a measurement
of whether or not time is passing.²⁷ All in all, the alleged analogy between the
illusionist account of passage and cases of change and motion illusions breaks
down upon analysis. The usefulness and empirical meaning of the term ‘illusion’
in cases of motion and change illusions does not carry over to the case of tempo-
ral passage; nothing, it seems, is gained philosophically by taking an illusionist
account of temporal qualia. As such, illusionism’s key thesis fails to offer any
explanatory advantage regarding temporal qualia over reductionism.
On the contrary, it is preferable to consider illusions like the rotating snakes
(fig. 1) in reductionist terms. When considering the illusory motion qualia, the
reductionist seeks no further explanation as to why in addition to the motion
qualia we appear also to experience animation or flow in the image. To think
there is something further that stands in need of explanation is, according to
reductionism, to make a category mistake — the appearance of animation or flow
in the image is just what it is like to represent motion. In holding the ‘dynamic’
²⁷Indeed, on standard passage-realist accounts, the passage of time is continuous and ubiqui-
tous — it is not something that stops and starts or varies from place to place.
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and ‘flow-like’ qualities of temporal experience to be a feature of what it is like
to represent motion or change, the reductionist gives up the idea that something
further than motion — i.e. temporal passage — is represented by temporal qualia.
6 An appetite for reduction
To recapitulate, reductionism about temporal qualia holds that:
(1) our temporal qualia amount to no more than the sum of change and motion
qualia and related kinds of qualia;
(2) each of these are simply what it is like to perceive the relevant physical phe-
nomenon (motion, change, etc.);
(3) there is no extra ‘passage quale’ that accompanies or unifies such qualia; and
(4) such qualia does not amount to a collective representation of temporal pas-
sage as something over and above a passage-antirealist ontology.
This section outlines in more detail the reductionist account of temporal
qualia and shows how it is supported by and continuous with various empirical
work in the study of time perception.
6.1 Understanding reductionism
The distinction between reductionism and illusionism is analogous to that be-
tween moral naturalism and moral error theory. Moral error theory shares with
moral realism the idea that moral statements are truth-apt and that they refer to
a realm of non-reductive moral facts, but holds that there are no such facts and
so moral statements are systematically false. Moral naturalism holds that moral
statements refer to contingent worldly matters of fact, and in this way avoids
both the epistemic problems of moral realism and error theory’s undesirable con-
sequence that all of our moral talk is outright false. Analogously, I’ve argued that
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the central problem with illusionism is precisely that it shares with passage re-
alism the claim that our temporal qualia represent temporal passage, which is
something over and above motion and change facts, and since illusionism is a
passage-antirealist position, it consequently holds that our temporal qualia are
systematically in error. I’ve argued that this error-theoretic claim of illusionism
plays no important explanatory role regarding temporal qualia, and the passage
antirealist is better off giving up the claim that temporal qualia represent or indi-
cate temporal passage. Just as moral naturalism allows for empirical import into
ethical questions, reductionism about temporal qualia shifts the focus of enquiry
about temporal qualia onto empirical issues concerning time perception.
6.2 Pluralism about temporal qualia
Reductionism gives a pluralist account of temporal qualia in that it takes tempo-
ral qualia to consist of a number of different kinds of qualia that are not necessar-
ily unified by some particular phenomenological property. This pluralist account
of temporal qualia makes sense of how we represent change and motion and un-
der what circumstances our motion and change qualia are misleading. Indeed,
the kinds of experience that we take to be temporal are in general quite varied
and distinct, whether it be seeing the change of a flickering picture, the motion
of a bird, sensing that a situation has endured for too long, or having the more
abstract feeling of disorientation at time having elapsed after waking from an un-
expected nap. This pluralism of temporal qualia is demonstrated even within our
main case study of motion perception, which is standardly categorised into first
and second orders. First order motion perception involves basic motion sensors
that are sensitive to spatiotemporal variations in luminance and colour. Second
order motion perception involves more complex qualities such as texture and
contrast. The first and second orders differ in a number of ways. For instance,
in the case of motion aftereffect, first-order motion detectors are more sensitive
to the adaptation to the stimulus, since their aftereffects last for twice the dura-
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tion as those of second-order detectors (Mather, 1991, p. 164),²⁸ and also second
order but not first order motion detection tails off markedly in peripheral vision
(Pantle, 1992).²⁹
Though it is an open question how exactly first and second order motion
peception relate, a wide range of studies on cognitive impairments in patients
indicate that first and second order motion detection owe to different neural
pathways and mechanisms (cf. Vaina and Cowey (1996); Nishida et al. (1997);
Greenlee and Smith (1997); Vaina et al. (1998)). For instance, Vaina and Soloviev
(2004, p. 197) suggest that ‘first-order motion is carried out by mechanisms along
the dorsal pathway in the occipital lobe, while the second-order motion by mech-
anisms mostly along the ventral pathway’. Such studies support a pluralistic un-
derstanding of motion perception, suggesting that motion qualia owe to a range
of distinct neural processes in response to a range of different kinds of stimuli.
This supports the wider idea that temporal qualia are associated in a number of
different ways with a range of distinct kinds of perception. This pluralist view of
temporal qualia does not cohere to the passage realist view that temporal qualia
are a response to a single phenomenon (passage), nor to the shared view of pas-
sage realists and illusionists that temporal qualia are a unified representation of
a single phenomenon (passage).
6.3 Motion blindness and temporal qualia
The study of motion blindness, or ‘akinetopsia’, is of particular relevance to the
understanding of temporal qualia. In such cases, patients have been noted to
have ‘perceptual experience of a moving target as if the visual stimulus remained
stationary but appeared at different successive positions’ (Zihl et al., 1983, p.
314),³⁰ and so in effect have awareness of change in position without accompany-
ing motion qualia. Most notably, with respect to explaining the flow-like quality
²⁸See also Ledgeway and Smith (1994) for an examination of the asymmetric durations of the
motion aftereffect in the cases of first and second order motion.
²⁹For a recent survey of first and second order motion detection, see Nishida (2011).
³⁰Zihl et al. (1983) are here referring to a patient studied by Pötzl and Redlich (1911).
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of temporal qualia, Zihl et al. (1983, p. 315) describe an affected patient’s ability
to pour coffee as compromised ‘because the fluid appeared to be frozen, like a
glacier’. Zihl et al’s study concerns a patient, LM, with acute akinetopsia, due to
bilaterally symmetric damage to the lateral temporo-occipital cortex, such that
LM complained of ‘a loss of movement vision in all three dimensions’ (p. 315), re-
stricting her ability to judge the speed of approaching trains, pour drinks without
overfilling, and cross roads; for instance LM reported that ‘people [are] suddenly
here or there but I have not seen them moving’. Studies on LM revealed that her
perception of motion in depth was ‘completely abolished’ (p. 334), with some
preservation of motion perception in targets moving along the horizontal and
vertical axes of LM’s inner visual field, though with no such motion perception
in the periphery. The motion blindness was restricted to visual motion, with LM
responding normally to both tactile and acoustic motion.
Zihl et al. (1983) furthermore studied LM’s motion perception with respect
to two of the motion illusions described in sec. 5, first the phi phenomenon, and
second motion aftereffect. LM lacked the ability perceive the phi-phenomenon:
when presented with several variations of the successive presentation of two
differently-positioned dots, ‘[u]nder no combination of conditions did the pa-
tient report apparent movement. She always reported two independent light
spots,’ in contrast to the control subject. Similarly, LM had significantly limited
susceptibility to the motion aftereffect, in comparison to a control subject. In the
case of a left-to-right-moving stimulus:
The patient reported some kind of a motion aftereffects in only 3 of
the 10 trials. Its duration, however, was rather short (1.2, 1.4 and 2.1
s) when compared with the normal subject tested under the same
conditions (mean duration 6.7 s; 5 inspection periods). The patient
described the motion after effect as an ’unrest’ of the pattern, but
never as movement. (p. 330)
These and other studies (cf. Zeki (1991)) on patients with varying degrees of
akinetopsia fit with the reductionist view of temporal qualia in a key way: the
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partial loss of the ability to detect motion is accompanied by a loss of temporal
qualia. Indeed, the literal flow of a fluid is specifically reported to be viewed as
‘frozen […] like a glacier’ in the case of LM. It is hard to think of a more exact
analogy with the static vs dynamic pictures standardly put forward within the
debate between passage-realist and passage-antirealist theories of time (i.e. the
central disagreement between A theorists and B theorists). In this sense, we can
see that the akinetopsic lacks certain temporal qualia, and accordingly there is a
reduced flow-like aspect of experience. The reductionist explanation here could
not be simpler — the covariance of the flow-like quality of experience with the
ability to represent motion is explained in terms of the former being a feature of
the latter; for the reductionist the apparently animated quality of perceiving real
or imaginary motion is nothing further than having motion qualia; it is simply
what it is like to perceive motion. The fact that the akinetopsic has restricted
temporal qualia compared to the control subject both in cases of real and illusory
motion is explained, according to reductionism, by the fact that the akinetopsic
has a restricted ability to represent motion.³¹
For the passage realist and the illusionist there is extra conceptual apparatus
with which to understand the case of akinetopsia, since these positions allow
us to distinguish between motion qualia — what it is like for something to ap-
pear in motion — and passage qualia — what it is like for time to appear to pass.
There are two broad options: either (1) the loss of motion qualia does not affect
the akinetopsic’s passage qualia; or (2) the akinetopsic has diminished passage
qualia. Let’s go through each of these options in turn. In case of (1), it is un-
appealing to hold that the akinetopsic’s passage qualia is unaffected, since the
missing qualia — the flow-like quality of motion — seems to be a prime candidate
³¹An interesting related case to that of akinetopsia is that of so-called ‘miracle cure’ patients,
such as the case of SB (Gregory and Wallace, 1963), who regained sight having been effectively
blind since early childhood. SB subsequently had great difficulty tracking an individual object
through movement, or whilst seeing it from different angles, resulting in a restricted ability to
perceive an individual object as in motion. See Kelly (2005) for a discussion of this in relation to
akinetopsia.
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for what constitutes the feeling of temporal passage on these accounts.³² As such,
the second option would appear to be the preferred one, that motion blindness
involves a loss of passage qualia.
In the case of (2), we require some account of why it is that motion qualia and
passage qualia covary in this way. It may very well be possible to extend one’s
account of realism or illusionism to accommodate this covariance of motion and
passage qualia in a coherent and elegant way. However, such a move would
be motivated by one’s background commitment to realism or illusionism rather
than being motivated by the phenomena. Unless there are good independent
empirical grounds for thinking that passage qualia could come apart from the set
of things like motion qualia, change qualia, etc., then there is no motivation to
adopt such positions in order to account for phenomena like motion blindness.
One such possibility would be if there were a phenomenon whereby a subject
could be stimulated to experience qualia consistent with the flow-like qualities
of temporal qualia, but without accompanying motion or change qualia. The
problems here is that, first, it is hard to know how such a thing could possibly be
established, and second, if such a thing were established, it would fail to explain
why perceptions of change and motion appear to be distinctively temporal, as
opposed to other kinds of qualia, after all.
The reductionist needs no such gymnastics. My suggestion is that the flow-
like aspect of motion qualia — that which is extremely vivid in figure 1 — is both
(a) a prime example of the flow-like qualities of temporal qualia in general that
are standardly taken to relate to the concept of temporal passage, and (b) just
³²One might suppose that there is still useful logical space here for distinguishing motion
qualia from the appearance of passage for the following reason: in order for a fluid to appear
frozen, is has to do so as time passes. I don’t agree. First, such cases of motion blindness are
usually understood in terms of time appearing to be like a series of still snapshots; while none of
these visibly endure, they can be assigned an apparent duration with reference to the patient’s
other sensory modalities, since things like auditory time perception are unaffected in cases of
visual motion blindness. Second, B theorists of time such as Mellor (1998) have provided plenti-
ful resources for talking about things like temporal extension and duration, such as the idea of
something being frozen for some period of time, without making reference to the idea of time as
passing.
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what it is like to ordinarily perceive real or illusory motion. In LM’s case, the
inhibited motion perception leads to a loss of motion qualia in cases of observing
moving bodies and in being presented with visual motion illusions. If we are to
look to empirical work in order to analyse and understand temporal qualia, the
study of akinetopsia seems to be of special relevance, and such studies neatly fit
a reductionist account of temporal qualia, and alone provide no additional need
to make reference to the concept of temporal passage.
7 Summing Up
Our conclusions are twofold. First, there are two importantly distinct explana-
tory programs concerning temporal qualia — (a) how temporal qualia relate to
the concept of temporal passage, and (b) how a different kinds of temporal qualia
are to be explained in terms of perception and cognition — , of which I’ve argued
only the latter need be addressed. Second, I’ve argued for a reductionist account
of temporal qualia over the alternative approaches (representational realism; in-
ferential realism; and illusionism). Reductionism, unlike the alternative three
approaches, considers temporal qualia entirely independently of the concept of
temporal passage. This is welcome for a number of key reasons: (i) no explana-
tory advantage is gained with respect to temporal qualia by referring to temporal
passage; (ii) the question of whether temporal qualia are illusory with respect to
passage is entirely independent of whether temporal qualia are illusory with re-
spect to change, motion and other temporal features of the world, and running
the two together creates grounds for confusion; (iii) the reductionist account of
temporal qualia is continuous with and well supported by empirical studies in
time perception.
These conclusions address several core issues in the philosophy of time. Our
experience of time is widely taken to be central to the debate between A and B
theorists insofar as it’s taken weigh in on whether one should be realist about
temporal passage. However, on the contrary we’ve seen that the relevant phe-
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nomenological aspects of our temporal experience — temporal qualia — cannot
settle the passage realism debate. This is because the realism debate ultimately
hangs on the background issue of whether temporal passage is necessary for tem-
poral qualia, and this amounts to a normative debate over how temporal qualia
ought to be explained. Furthermore, it is commonly argued that the explanatory
task for the passage antirealist (or B-theorist) is to account our dynamic experi-
ence of time in a static universe. However, to understand the passage antirealist’s
task in this way is to give too much value to the terms of the passage debate, and
to run together the problems of temporal passage and temporal qualia. We’ve
seen that insofar as empirical work in the psychology of time can illuminate the
issue of temporal qualia, it does so in terms of how the varied types of temporal
qualia that we ordinarily have are grounded in our cognition of processes in the
world. Questions of this type are not only amenable to empirically-informed phi-
losophy, but a considerable amount of relevant empirical work has been carried
out and it is known in great detail how different kinds of temporal qualia are pro-
jected onto our experience by parts of our brain in response to certain triggers,
and what functions these have and why we might have developed them. Reflec-
tion on such studies, I’ve argued, supports a reductionist account of temporal
qualia, suggesting that our temporal experience consists of a range of different
kinds of perception that in ordinary conditions reliably indicate various kinds of
physical processes in the world, rather than collectively tracking or representing
an independent phenomenon of temporal passage.
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